America paralyses Lebanon's anger

To stifle UN outrage after the Qana massacre threatens a wounded people, says Anthony Parsons

Anthony Parsons
Friday 10 May 1996 23:02 BST
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Whatever the outcome of the present row at the United Nations in New York about the Israeli bombing of Qana, the Middle East peace process is unlikely to be affected. Its future will depend on forces outside the UN: the result of forthcoming Israeli elections and progress or otherwise in Palestinian/Israeli and Syrian/Israeli negotiations.

Today's crisis is about the Lebanon, an intrinsically unaggressive country, which has suffered far heavier civilian casualties as a consequence of the Arab-Israeli dispute than any other state in the region. I confess that I have only the slimmest expectation that the United States, with its veto power and identification with Israel, will permit the Security Council to take positive action which could be helpful to the people of Lebanon; indeed, the reverse is now on the cards if Unifil is forced by Israeli pressure to withdraw from Lebanon.

For years, UN Security Council discussion of the Arab-Israeli dispute has tended toward one of two results - either a resolution so innocuous as to be meaningless, or an American veto of anything critical of Israel. The American and Israeli aversion to Security Council involvement has converged, the public rationale since 1991 being that with the parties now in direct negotiation, outside interference must be avoided.

On the whole, this policy has carried the day. With the end of the Cold War, the relegation of Russia to spectator status and Saddam Hussein's exposure of the Arab need for American power, Arab governments have largely abandoned recourse to the Council. The Americans have in fact only had to cast one veto since 1990.

In the "bad old days" before the New World Order, Lebanese governments frequently brought to the Council Israeli attacks on or invasion of their territory, running into 10 American vetoes between 1982 and 1988. The present Lebanese government has been more circumspect.

Even in the face of the ferocity of the Israeli retaliation against Hizbollah last month, the Arab world held its hand for several days while 10 per cent of the population of Lebanon were driven from their homes, ports were closed, electricity installations near Beirut were bombed, the coast road subjected to shelling and civilian casualties mounted. It was only after more than 100 civilians were killed by Israeli artillery fire in the UN base at Qana that the Security Council was mobilised. It is a measure of current American power that an Arab draft resolution condemning Israel and calling for withdrawal from the "security zone" secured only four votes (five less than the minimum of nine out of 15 required for adoption, provided a veto is not exercised) and the eventual resolution, adopted unanimously on 18 April, made no mention of Israel and avoided any suggestion of blame for what had happened at Qana and elsewhere.

This almost inaudible international bleat may have been preferable at the time to a bad-tempered debate culminating in an American veto, but it cannot have appeased the outrage felt by Lebanese of all sectarian and religious persuasion as Israeli artillery, aircraft and gunboats continued to pound away.

A General Assembly debate provided an opportunity for Arab delegations, including the president of Lebanon, to let off steam but, when the ceasefire came into effect on 26 April, it looked as though the curtain had fallen on the insignificant play in New York.

The report on Qana by the UN General Franklin van Kappen and its public circulation to Security Council members by the Secretary General has brought the curtain back up with a jerk, revealing a major diplomatic row. The report is meticulously drafted, giving full space to the Israeli point of view. However, van Kappen's finding is that "while the possibility cannot be ruled out completely, it is unlikely that the shelling of the United Nations compound was the result of gross technical and/or procedural errors". In his covering note, the Secretary General, while setting out the Israeli view - operational mistakes and technical failures compounded by chance - effectively endorses van Kappen's findings.

According to reports, the Israelis have dismissed the report as "absurd"and are talking of the necessity for Unifil to be withdrawn. The Americans are said to have exploded with rage at the Secretary General. Arab delegates are talking of a resolution condemning Israel and demanding compensation. The rest of the Council, including Britain, seem to be keeping their heads below the parapet, although the British ambassador was reported as saying that the report must be taken seriously.

The Americans will try hard to bury the report, with the Council at most "taking note" of it. It remains to be seen whether they can prevail on the Arabs to comply. If not, and there is a resolution critical of Israel, it will be vetoed if, which is not certain, it secures nine votes; much will depend on the four Western members, including Britain, which will come under strong, conflicting pressures.

American readiness to paralyse the Security Council on Israel's behalf has long been taken for granted in New York, but still excites resentment: Washington is unlikely to be the flavour of the month either in the UN or the Middle East as a result of this crisis. Conversely, the fact that the Secretary General and his staff have been prepared to stand up and be counted in public will do the UN as an institution a power of good in a large number of states.

It will be tragic if the ordinary people of south Lebanon have to suffer further as a consequence of this diplomatic storm. Without Israeli co- operation, Unifil could not remain in the south and the Americans can easily veto the renewal of its mandate. Unifil has never been able to carry out its full functions, but, for 18 years, it has provided some protection for local inhabitants. If Unifil leaves, they will be in greater danger than before from both sides. This consideration should surely weigh with the policy makers.

Sur Anthony Parsons was UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations between 1979 and 1982.

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